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Productivity under Large Pay Increases: 
Evidence from Professional Baseball 
 
The establishment of the free agency system in the 1970s resulted in large salary increases 
among professional baseball players. Historical data show that players have tended to 
perform better at early stages of their careers since free agency was introduced. Under the 
current salary bargaining system, players only become eligible for salary arbitration and free 
agency at predetermined points in their careers, resulting in sudden changes in salary growth 
rates at these points. Using data on official days of major league service, it is found that 
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Economists have traditionally believed that in a competitive labor market, workers 
will receive wage rates equal to their productivity levels and that the latter is determined 
exogenously by factors such as education and training. In recent decades, however, a 
number of studies have cast doubt on this assumption and have suggested that, at least to 
some extent, productivity may respond to wages. 
U.S. professional baseball provides an ideal setting in which to study whether pay can 
influence a person’s productivity. Not only is accurate and comprehensive productivity 
data available at the individual level, in the form of performance statistics, but a major 
change in the salary bargaining system occurred in the 1970s. Prior to this point, players 
were tied to the same team for their entire career, giving each team monopsonistic powers. 
However, since 1977 players with at least 3 years of experience may choose to have an 
independent arbitrator settle salary disputes and players with at least 6 years of 
experience have the right to become “free agents” once they are out of contract, meaning 
they can sign for any team they like. The introduction of salary arbitration has resulted in 
much higher salary growth among those players who are affected, while contract 
durations have increased among those who are eligible for free agency (Kahn 1993). 
Since the free agency system induces extremely large and sudden changes in salaries at 
predetermined points in a player’s career, it provides an exogenous source of income 
growth, unrelated to a player’s past performance. 
The paper will take two approaches to determining whether the free agency system 
influences how well a player performs. In the first, performance data from before and 
after the introduction of free agency will be compared. Other factors have been 
responsible for aggregate changes in the relative performance of hitters and pitchers over 
time, however since salary arbitration and free agency only apply to those with more than 
3 or 6 years of experience, respectively, the performance of players at different stages of 
their careers can be compared. The second approach focuses on five recent seasons for 
which exact information on a player’s salary and eligibility for free agency is available.   2 
The rules governing the free agency system allow the separate effects of experience and 
salary growth on performance to be identified, using both instrumental variables and 
regression-discontinuity approaches. 
This paper makes three main contributions to the literature studying the effects of pay 
structure on productivity. Firstly, it uses accurate measures of individual productivity for 
all workers within a particular industry, rather than just a single firm as in previous 
related studies. Secondly, because the pay increases associated with free agency were 
essentially imposed on team owners and because teams are unlikely to incur any costs of 
monitoring players’ effort levels, there should be no problem of endogenous adoption or 
adjustment of pay policy by teams. Finally, by introducing exogenous shifts in players’ 
salary growth rates at different points throughout their careers, the free agency system 
allows a test of whether a given player exhibits a spike in performance at those points, 
thus controlling for unobserved person-specific differences in productivity. 
 
2. Background 
The literature studying the productivity effects of efficiency wages consists of two 
broad approaches. The first involves analyzing firm-, region-  or industry-level data. 
These papers typically use the average productivity of workers within each firm, 
sometimes controlling for the average attributes of the firm’s workers. Examples include 
Wadhwani and Wall (1991), Levine (1992), Nickell and Nicolitsas (1997) and Fuess and 
Millea (2002). The majority of these studies find that average productivity rises when the 
relative wage at a firm increases. 
The second class of papers analyses surveys of individuals within certain sectors of 
the economy. Although these studies examine the labor market behavior of individual 
workers, they do not often have good direct measures of productivity, so tend to look for 
indirect evidence of efficiency wage models. Moretti and Perloff (2002) studied the U.S. 
agricultural labor market and found that direct-hire growers receive higher wages than 
farm contractors and that both offer deferred payments to workers, suggesting that the 
direct-hire growers are paying an efficiency wage. Georgiadis (2008) found that the 
introduction of a minimum wage in the United Kingdom resulted in a reduction in the 
fraction of managerial staff employed at residential care homes, consistent with the   3 
notion that higher wages circumvent the need for supervision of employees. Georgiadis’s 
study is closely related to the current paper in that it focuses on the productivity effects of 
a rise in the minimum wage, which is an enforced pay increase for an entire segment of 
the workforce rather than a profit-maximizing decision by a firm. In contrast to both 
Moretti and Perloff and Georgiadis, however, data are available for players on all major 
league baseball teams, akin to having observations for all workers in an industry rather 
than in just one firm. 
A separate but related literature has analyzed the effect performance related pay has 
on worker productivity.
1
A handful of previous authors have examined what happens to performance among 
major league baseballers who elect to become free agents and sign contracts with 
different teams. Grad (1998) and Holden and Sommers (2005) noted that players might 
be motivated to put in extra effort in the year prior to filing for free agency in order to 
impress potential bidders. Krautmann (1990) argued instead that there is an incentive for 
a player to shirk immediately after signing a multiple-year contract. Both hypotheses 
predict that a player’s performance will decline immediately after he signs a free agent 
contract, however none of the papers find significant evidence of this. 
 These generally find support for the idea that productivity is 
higher under piece rates than under fixed wages. Again, this literature includes those 
papers using firm-level data (e.g. Gielen, Kerkhofs, and van Ours 2010) and those using 
worker-level data (e.g. Booth and Frank 1999; Pekkarinen and Riddell 2008), but also a 
number of studies that look at workers within a single firm (e.g. Lazear 2000; Shearer 
2004;  Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul  2005). These intra-firm studies collect direct 
measures of individual productivity and use longitudinal data, allowing them to control 
for the fact that more able workers are more likely to have performance-related contracts. 
However, as Pekkarinen and Riddell note, they are still likely to suffer from a selection 
problem, since compensation policy at the firm level is likely to be endogenous. This 
analysis in this paper avoids this problem by using longitudinal data for the workers in all 
firms in an industry (or, in this case, for players in all major league teams). 
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, this paper examines the effects of eligibility 
                                                 
1 All major league baseball players receive bonuses if their team reaches the post-season and some 
contracts also include bonuses for reaching specific performance targets, although they are not piece rates 
as studied by the authors listed.   4 
for salary arbitration and free agency on the performance of all players, not just those 
players who sign new free-agent  contracts. Average annual salary growth is highest 
among those players who pass the threshold for eligibility for salary arbitration, before 
they are even eligible for free agency. Furthermore, focusing on the effects of filing for 
free agency will induce an endogeneity problem, since the decision of whether and when 
to file may be affected by a player’s past performance. 
 
3. The free agency system 
The early days of professional baseball were plagued by players regularly shifting 
teams during the middle of seasons in search of pay increases. To combat this, team 
owners made an agreement before the 1879 season not to sign any of five “reserved” 
players on each others’ teams. The number of reserved players rose to include the entire 
team by 1883 and in 1887 was made a formal contract clause. This so-called reserve 
clause formed the basis of the baseball labor market for almost a century. Essentially, it 
meant that teams could make take-it-or-leave-it offers to their players. Players had no 
means by which to persuade the team to increase their salary offer, except the threat of 
retirement: if a player refused to accept a contract, he was unable to play anywhere else 
in the major leagues. 
Throughout the 1970s, the reserve clause system was progressively dismantled. 
Firstly, team owners agreed to a system of salary arbitration in 1973, following a strike 
by players the previous year. Under this system, if a player and team cannot agree on a 
contract, either party may file for arbitration. The arbitrator must choose between the 
final contract offers made by the player and team, based solely on the player’s 
performance, the club’s record and attendance and the salaries of players with the same 
amount of major league experience.
2
                                                 
2 For players with less than 5 years of major league service, arbitrators may also take into account the 
salaries of players with one extra year of experience. 
 Both sides are obligated to accept this contract. In 
practice, most contracts are settled by players and teams before reaching arbitration. 
Under current rules, a player is eligible for salary arbitration if he has accrued more than 
three, but less than six, years of major league service. In addition, among those players 
with between two and three years of service who have accumulated at least 86 days of   5 
service during the previous season, the top 17% ranked by total service time are eligible 
for salary arbitration. This is known as the “Super Two” exception. 
Meanwhile, beginning in 1970, the legality of the reserve clause was challenged in a 
series of cases. Although the Supreme Court ruled that the reserve clause was legal in 
1972, Catfish Hunter became the first free agent in 1974 after he won a contract dispute 
in arbitration. The contract he subsequently signed made him the highest paid player in 
baseball the following season. Finally, in 1975 Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally 
refused to sign new contracts. Although their teams renewed their contracts from the 
previous season, the players argued that since no contract had been signed, they would 
not be bound to the team for the following season and in December 1975 an arbitrator 
agreed. Although team owners finally conceded that the reserve clause was unenforceable, 
they argued that the cost of developing young players was so high they needed a 
guaranteed period of time during which they could recover their investment. Under an 
agreement reached with the players’ union in 1977, a player is bound to his original team 
for his first six years, as per the reserve clause. However, after they have accumulated six 
years of major league service, players can now become free agents and sign with 
whichever team they wish. Of course, if players sign long-term contracts before the end 
of their sixth season, they relinquish this right. 
In the three decades since the introduction of the free agency system, average salaries 
have risen dramatically in the major leagues. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the average 
salary across the major leagues between 1950 and 2009, along with the league minimum 
salary. Average salaries began increasing rapidly after the introduction of free agency and 
have continued to rise at a reasonably steady rate since. The minimum salary has also 
been raised regularly since the early 1970s, although it has not kept pace with the average 
salary. The ratio of the average to minimum salary was around 4 in 1977, rose to a 
maximum of 11.5 in 2002 before falling back to 7.5 in 2009 as the minimum was doubled.  
Players’ salaries typically follow three distinct phases over the course of their careers. 
During their first three complete seasons, they are almost always signed to one-year 
contracts at the prevailing league minimum. For their next three seasons, during which 
they are not free agents but are eligible for salary arbitration, they tend to receive rapidly 
increasing salaries, regardless of whether they actually file for arbitration or not. Finally,  6 
after six years, players receive relatively stable salaries that are close to (and may even 
exceed) their marginal revenue product (Sommers and Quinton 1982; Blass 1992). This 
is seen in Figure 2, which depicts the average salary-experience profile in 1977 and 2009. 
Salaries typically increased with experience in both years (although initial salaries were 
about 11 times higher in real terms in 2009).
3
                                                 
3 As Blass (1992) speculates, the fact that an upward-sloping career earnings profile already existed in 1977 
(before free agency was established) might be the result of a compromise between the desire of teams to 
ensure performance incentives by paying piece rates and the desire of players to have a smooth source of 
income. 
 As predicted, earnings grew at a similar 
rate over a player’s early career in both periods, however they grew much faster during 
the player’s salary arbitration eligibility period in 2009. The pattern is exacerbated if only 
players in the first year of their contracts in 2009 are considered. Among this group, 
salaries actually fall after the first year of free agency eligibility, because the best players 
are tied to long-term contracts as soon as they become eligible. 
Figure 1 
























































































Notes:  The average salary data are obtained from the Major League Baseball Players Association for 
1964-2009, with decadal averages taken from Haupert (2007) used for earlier years. 
Both series are expressed in 2009 dollars, adjusted using the Consumer Price Index deflator.   7 
Major league service time is used to determine whether a player is eligible for salary 
arbitration or free agency and is measured in years and days. The maximum amount of 
service time that a player may accumulate each year is 172 days, even though a season 
typically lasts longer than that. As well as time spent on a team’s 25-man active roster, 
service time includes time spent injured (known as being on a team’s disabled list) or on 
the suspended list. Time spent in the minor leagues does not generally count towards 
service time, however players who spend no more than 20 days on optional assignment in 






























































Notes:  1977 data are from Rodney fort’s sports business website (http://www.rodneyfort.com); 2009 data 
are from the Baseball Archive. 
The data points are the coefficients from separate regressions of annual salary on a set of dummies 
for years of major league experience in 1977 and 2009. All players are used except for the new 
signings series, where only players in the first year of their contracts are used. 
Estimated years of experience are used for the series including all players; actual service time is 
used for the new signings series.   8 
4. Data 
The primary data for this paper are taken from Sean Lahman’s Baseball Archive 
(available from www.baseball1.com) for the period 1950-2009. This contains annual data 
on the performance of each player in the major leagues. This study will focus on two 
measures of performance: on-base plus slugging (OPS) for non-pitchers and earned run 
average (ERA) for pitchers. A player’s OPS is the sum of his on base percentage (defined 
as times-on-base per plate appearance, excluding sacrifice hits, fielder’s obstruction or 
catcher’s interference) and his slugging percentage (defined as total bases scored per at-
bat).
4
Since the Baseball Archive dataset does not record the time players spend on the 
disabled list, it is impossible to calculate a player’s service time using it. However, data 
on players’ career service time at the beginning of each season from 2005-2009 were 
obtained from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts website (
 ERA is defined as earned runs conceded per 9 innings pitched. Hence, a higher 
OPS but a lower ERA indicates higher productivity. Non-pitchers are excluded from 
regressions for OPS in seasons where they have fewer than 100 plate appearances and 
pitchers are excluded from regressions for ERA in seasons when they pitch fewer than 50 
innings. 
www.mlbcontracts.blogspot.com) 
and merged with the Baseball Archive data.
5
The service time data reveal that, on average, non-pitchers who attain a year of 
service time play at least 110 games (out of 162). Similarly, for pitchers to complete a 
full year of service requires an average of 60 games for relievers and 30 games for 
 Information on the start and finish years of 
every contract signed between 2005 and 2009 was also obtained from the same source, 
along with whether the contract specified any performance bonuses (such as additional 
pay for being selected for the annual All-Star Game). Service time data are available for 
89% of observations on both pitchers and non-pitchers, however the unmatched 
observations account for very little game time (they account for only 4% of at-bats 
among non-pitchers and 5% of innings pitched among pitchers). 
                                                 
4 OPS is preferred to batting average as it takes into account a player’s ability to draw walks and score 
extra-base hits, as well as to hit singles. Nonetheless, the results in the next two sections were very similar 
when batting average was used to measure non-pitchers’ performance. 
5 Cot’s Contracts is maintained by Jeff Euston, who updates the service time data each year largely based 
on information from the Associated Press and local newspapers covering individual clubs. Sports 
Illustrated Interactive  described it as “the unofficial clearinghouse for MLB contracts” and “the most 
reliable public source” on baseball contract data (Donovan 2008).   9 
starters (defined as those who start at least one game during the season). Using this 
information, a rough estimate of the service time completed by players in the 1950-2009 
sample can be constructed. Table A1 presents descriptive statistics for pitchers and non-
pitchers, separately for the 1950-1969 and 1981-2009 periods. OPS among non-hitters 
rose between the two periods, which naturally meant that ERA also rose among pitchers. 
The average player was slightly more experienced (as measured by estimated service 
time) in the later period. 
Means for the 2005-2009 sample are given in Table A2. Around 40% of non-pitchers 
and 50% of pitchers are in their first three years in the major leagues and are thus 
ineligible for salary arbitration. A quarter of both samples are eligible for salary 
arbitration but not free agents (including those in their last year before free agency), 
while the remainder are free agents. Table A2 also gives means for the narrower sample 
of players with 2-4 years of experience that will be used in the next section. This sample 
is evenly split between those eligible and those ineligible for salary arbitration. 
 
5. Historical approach 
To determine whether the advent of salary arbitration and free agency has changed 
how well players of different experience levels perform, the individual-level data for 
1950-2009 are analyzed. As noted in the previous section, multiple changes in baseball 
labor relations occurred during the 1970s, suggesting that it is not appropriate to analyze 
the seasons that immediately preceded the change to free agency. As a result, data for the 
1970s are excluded and the performance of players between 1950 and 1969 will be 
compared with players during the 1981-2009 period. 
The performance measures are regressed on a set of 15 dummies for major league 
experience interacted with whether it is before or after the introduction of free agency, 
along with player dummies and year dummies.
6
                                                 
6 The results are almost identical if a set of home ballpark dummies are added to control for the effects of 
stadia of different dimensions. Gould and Winter (2009) provide evidence that the ability of a player’s 
team-mates may also influence his performance, however that possibility is ignored here. 
 Tables 1 and 2 present the estimates on 
the experience terms, with 0 years of experience being the omitted category. OPS tended 
to drop off early in a player’s career in the 1950s and 1960s, as seen in the first two 
columns of Table 1. Since 1980, however, it has actually risen over a player’s first three   10 
years in the major leagues and even then has fallen more slowly than in the earlier period. 
The difference between the coefficients across the two time periods is significant among 
players with two or more years of experience. Although not reported, the predicted 
change in a player’s OPS from gaining an additional year of experience was calculated 
for the pre- and post-free agency periods. Only the change from one to two years of 
experience was  significantly different between the two eras.  Figure 3  presents the 
Table 1 
Regressions for On-Base Plus Slugging Before and After the Introduction of Free Agency 
 
Variable  Full sample  Players with at least 10 seasons 
1950-1969  1981-2009  1950-1969  1981-2009 


















































































































Adjusted R-squared  0.496  0.548 
Number of observations  16,589  5,664 
Notes:  Both regressions also include a full set of year and player dummies. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. †, †† and ††† denote significance from the pre-1970 coefficient at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
   11 
predicted OPS at each experience level for the pre-1970 and post-1980 periods.
7
Among pitchers, ERA has followed a different pattern. In both the pre- and post-free 
agency periods, pitchers have tended to decline steadily in performance as they age, as 
 
Although hitters post higher OPS values at every point during their careers in the post-
free agency period, the gap widens significantly after two years of experience, as noted 
above. 
                                                 
7 The predicted OPS is the coefficient on experience plus the average of the year effects for either the pre-
1970 or post-1980 period. 
Table 2 
Regressions for Earned Run Average Before and After the Introduction of Free Agency 
 
Variable  Full sample  Players with at least 10 seasons 
1950-1969  1981-2009  1950-1969  1981-2009 


















































































































Adjusted R-squared  0.230  0.221 
Number of observations  15,935  3,886 
Notes:  Both regressions also include a full set of year and player dummies. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. †, †† and ††† denote significance from the pre-1970 coefficient at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively.   12 
seen in the first two columns of Table 2. Furthermore, the gap between the coefficients is 
significant only for players with one year of experience and Figure 4 shows that although 
ERAs have been higher for all players since 1980, the rate of increase in ERA over a 
player’s career is very similar in the two periods. 
Over time, less successful players are more likely to retire, meaning that the higher 
experience levels are dominated by more able players. By including player effects, the 
regressions in the first two columns of Tables 1 and 2 already control for this fact.
8
                                                 
8 If player effects are excluded, an upward-sloping career performance profile is found for both pitchers and 
non-pitchers. 
 
However, they still force all players to have the same career performance profile, 
regardless of how long their careers are. The estimated experience coefficients are then 
interpreted as the change in performance from a player’s debut season to a given point in 
his career, averaged over all players who made it to that point. The players who manage 
Figure 3 


































All players before 1970




Notes:  The data points for “all players” and “veterans” are the predicted performance levels from the 
regressions in the first two and last two columns of Table 1, respectively. 
  “Veterans” are players who completed at least 10 seasons during their careers.   13 
to reach their seventh season and attain free agency eligibility are  likely to have 
performed better over their first six seasons than indicated by Figures 3 and 4, because 
only the best players survive this long in the major leagues. 
To examine the performance profiles of those players, Figures 3 and 4 also plot the 
predicted performance at each experience level among only players who completed at 
least 10 seasons in the major leagues. Not surprisingly, these players perform better than 
their team-mates at most points during their careers. Among veteran non-pitchers, OPS 
increases sharply during the first four seasons in both time periods, however as with the 
full sample, it increases much more in the third season in the post-1980 period. On the 
other hand, while long-serving pitchers experienced steadily declining performances 
before 1970 (like the full sample of pitchers), since 1980 veteran pitchers have tended to 
experience falling ERAs in their first two seasons and relatively stable ERAs thereafter. 
Taken together, the evidence in this section indicates that in the modern era both 
Figure 4 
































All players before 1970




Notes:  The data points for “all players” and “veterans” are the predicted performance levels from the 
regressions in the first two and last two columns of Table 2, respectively. 
“Veterans” are players who completed at least 10 seasons during their careers.   14 
pitchers and non-pitchers enjoy rapid improvements early in their careers followed by a 
period of remarkably consistent performances. Other than changing career salary profiles 
generated by the introduction of the free agency system, alternative explanations for why 
players have aged “more gracefully” in the free agency era exist. Since the 1960s, there 
has been increased use of relief pitchers, which is likely to benefit older pitchers, by 
allowing them to pitch fewer innings per game than in the earlier era. Similarly, the 
introduction of the designated hitter in the American League in 1973 may have aided 
older non-pitchers. It is possible to control for these factors by introducing controls for 
the proportion of a pitcher’s games in which he started and a dummy for designated hitter. 
These did not affect the pattern seen in Figures 3 and 4. 
Despite these controls, the fact that salary arbitration and free agency were introduced 
for all players at the same point in time means that the results in this section may be 
driven by some other (possibly unobservable) factor that altered the performance-
experience profile and occurred during the 1970s. For example, advances in medicine or 
the increased prevalence of steroid use during the 1980s could explain why older players 
are increasingly able to maintain higher performance levels. Of course, these trends could 
themselves be driven in part by the higher salaries arising from the introduction of salary 
arbitration and free agency, however the approach used is unable to determine this. For 
that reason, the next section will focus on differences in performance over players’ 
careers in the post-free agency period using detailed data on their salaries and contracts. 
 
6. Quasi-experimental approach 
As Krautmann (1990) observed, once a player signs a contract, there is no incentive 
for him to expend extra effort, regardless of his salary, as he is guaranteed an income for 
the duration of the contract. Unlike the assumptions underlying traditional efficiency 
wage models, performance in baseball is measurable and publicly observable but teams 
have no ability to fire players for underperforming after a contract has been signed. 
However, if a player shirks he reduces his likelihood of signing a lucrative contract in the 
future. Hence, the expectation  of future salary increases might spur baseballers to 
improve their performances. 
Of course, future income is likely to be influenced by a player’s current performance,   15 
leading to an identification problem. Fortunately, the rules surrounding eligibility for 
salary arbitration and free agency provide an ideal method of isolating the causal effect of 
expected salary growth on performance. Since players are only eligible for free agency 
after they have completed six full years of major league service and since free agency 
may only be awarded at the end of a season, one player may be a free agent and another 
not a free agent, even though the former had accrued only one extra day of service time 
prior to the current season. Similarly, players are eligible for salary arbitration if they 
have completed more than three but less than six years of service or satisfy the Super 
Two exception.
9
The approach taken in the previous section used players from the pre-free agency era 
as a control group for players in the modern era. In contrast, the quasi-experimental 
approach used below isolates the instantaneous effects that changes in salary growth have 
on a given player’s performance. Although this approach is better placed to isolate the 
causal influence of the free agency system on players’ performances, it is unable to detect 
any long-run effects that increased salaries may have had on the behavior of players. In 
other words, while the results reported below may provide evidence that players expend 
more effort in seasons when they are affected by changing salaries, they do not capture 
any long-run adjustments that players make to their training regimes or playing styles in 
anticipation of high future salaries. 
 As seen in Figure 2, these phases of a player’s career are associated with 
vastly different rates of salary growth. However, although a player’s performance is 
likely to be affected by his experience, there is no reason to expect it to jump or fall 
abruptly as a player becomes eligible for salary arbitration or free agency. Therefore, any 
sharp change in performance that occurs at the thresholds for salary arbitration or free 
agency can be attributed to the effects of changes in salary growth. 
 
Instrumental variables estimation 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of estimating the effects of salary growth on a 
player’s performance, controlling for his experience. The following equation was 
estimated for player i in year t: 
                                                 
9 A difference here is that the existence of the Super Two exception means that teams are effectively 
prevented from manipulating their players’ service times to avoid letting them become eligible for 
arbitration, as they do not know in advance what the service time threshold will be.   16 
it t i it it t i it SERV SERV SAL y ε γ µ α α α + + + + + ∆ = +
2
3 2 ) 1 ( 1 ln ,  (1) 
where y is OPS for non-pitchers and ERA for pitchers, SERV is career service time (in 
years) at the beginning of the season and μ  and γ  are player and year fixed effects, 
respectively.
10 SAL ln ∆    is the change in a player’s log real salary (or approximate salary 
growth rate) from season t to season  1 + t . For players who are not observed in or are 
missing salary data for  1 + t ,   SAL ln ∆  is set equal to zero, equivalent to assuming they 
would have earned the same salary as in  t. Players in the middle of multiple-year 
contracts will know their following year’s salary with certainty, however most players 
will not know this. The full sample of players for whom service time data were available 
over the 2005-2009 period is used, although the 2009 observations are lost during the 
construction of the salary growth variable. 
Among non-pitchers, the salary growth rate is found to have a positive effect on OPS 
when Equation (1) is estimated by OLS (as reported in column (1) of Table 3). As noted, 
however, this specification suffers from an obvious endogeneity problem; to alleviate this 
problem, an instrumental variables approach is taken. A set of “salary bargaining class”
                                                 
10 Again, the results are virtually identical if home ballpark effects are added. 
Table 3 
Regressions for On-Base Plus Slugging Using Service Time Data 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


































Log salary  –  –  –  -0.012* 
(0.005) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.551  0.541  0.542  0.543 
Number of observations  1,636  1,636  1,636  1,636 
Notes:  All regressions include a full set of player and year dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered by salary bargaining class and are presented in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
In columns (2)-(4), the salary growth rate is instrumented for using a set of salary bargaining class 
dummies and the average salary growth rate of players with an extra year of experience.   17 
dummies was used as instruments for salary growth, indicating whether a player is 
eligible for salary arbitration but has less than 5 years of service time, has at least 5 but 
less than 6 years of service time or has at least 6 years of service time and is therefore 
eligible for free agency.
11 These are measured at the end of the current season, as new 
contracts are typically signed after a given season has concluded.
12
As noted in Section 3, arbitrators take into account the salaries of players with the 
same amount of experience when settling salary disputes between players and teams, 
which has the effect of anchoring the salaries of players who are eligible for salary 
arbitration, even if they do not file for arbitration. Therefore, players may expect to 
receive salary growth rates that are similar to those recent cohorts of players received at 
the same stage in their careers. This suggests the construction of an additional instrument: 
the salary growth rate in the past year among players with one extra year of service time 
 
                                                 
11 A separate dummy for being in the last year before free agency is included because salaries of players in 
their fifth season are close to those of free agents, as seen in Figure 2. Kahn (1993) argues that teams wish 
to tie such players to long-term contracts at free agency salary levels before they are able to leave the team 
as free agents. 
12 One concern is that a player does not know for certain what his service time will be at the end of the 
current season, as injuries or demotions may prevent him from moving up a bargaining class. However, 
only a tiny number of players fail to move up a class when they require less than a year of service time 
during a season to do so. 
Table 4 
Regressions for Earned Run Average Using Service Time Data 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


































Log salary  –  –  –  -0.072 
(0.139) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.326  0.315  0.315  0.323 
Number of observations  1,769  1,769  1,769  1,769 
Notes:  All regressions include a full set of player and year dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered by salary bargaining class and are presented in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
In columns (2)-(4), the salary growth rate is instrumented for using a set of salary bargaining class 
dummies and the average salary growth rate of players with an extra year of experience.   18 
than a given player. 
Equation (1) was estimated for non-pitchers using this set of instruments for salary 
growth. All the instruments are found to have highly significant positive coefficients in 
the first stage equation, as expected. As reported in column (2) of Table 3, the coefficient 
on   SAL ln ∆  falls, although it is still significant. Players who become eligible for salary 
arbitration at the end of a season experience an average salary growth rate of 1.23 
compared to just 0.15 for the previous season. The results indicate that these players will 
experience a 0.012 increase in their OPS as a result of this change. Service time has a 
negative effect on OPS, which is consistent with the pattern seen in Figure 3. 
Holden and Sommers (2005) and Grad (1998) noted that players might increase their 
effort in the year before filing for free agency in order to sign for another team. Therefore, 
in column (3) of Table 3, a dummy variable (LASTYR) is added for those players who are 
in the last years of their contracts.
13
Column (4) of Table 3 adds the player’s current log salary as a regressor, to examine 
whether the relationship between performance and expected pay growth is affected by 
how much a player is already earning. As mentioned earlier, a player’s salary is 
guaranteed for the duration of his contract, so that salary in a given season can be treated 
as predetermined from the perspective of a player choosing how much effort to put into 
his performance. Including log salary as a regressor in Equation (1)  reduces the 
coefficient on salary growth only slightly. Current salary has a negative effect on 
 A dummy variable (BONUS) is also added for those 
players whose current contracts include any performance bonuses, since such payments 
might be expected to improve performance. The inclusion of these terms does not affect 
the coefficient on the salary growth rate. Being in the last year of a contract raises a 
batter’s OPS. This contradicts the findings of Grad and Holden and Sommers, who found 
no evidence of a “contract year” effect, although those authors looked only at players 
who actually filed for free agency (meaning that they were both eligible for free agency 
and did not sign a new contract with their current team). The bonus dummy has a positive 
coefficient, but it is not significant. 
                                                 
13 Players who are in the last year of their contracts but whose contracts give them the option to unilaterally 
re-sign for the following season are given zeros for the last year dummy.   19 
performance, suggesting that for a given level of salary growth, those already earning 
more perform worse. 
Table 4 reports of the results of estimating Equation (1) for pitchers. Once again, a 
player’s salary growth rate is associated with improved performance – in this case a 
reduced ERA. The IV results imply that a pitcher who passes the threshold for salary 
arbitration eligibility at the end of a season will experience a decline in ERA of between 
0.147 and 0.275. Being in the last year of a contract also decreases a pitcher’s ERA, 
however bonus payments have no effect on performance. 
 
Regression-discontinuity estimation 
The effect of salary growth in the above approach is identified solely by the 
discontinuities in the relationship between salary growth and experience. Exploiting this 
fact more explicitly, a tighter test can be obtained by comparing performances between 
players with experience levels just below and just above the thresholds for eligibility for 
salary arbitration or free agency. This approach, known as regression-discontinuity 
analysis, has been taken by other studies that have attempted to identify the causal effect 
an endogenously-determined variable has on some outcome using  discontinuities 
between the endogenous variable and an “assignment variable” (e.g. Angrist and Lavy 
1999; Jacob and Lefgren 2004; Hoekstra 2009). Since the largest change in a player’s 
salary occurs at the point he becomes eligible for salary arbitration (and because sample 
sizes become too small among more experienced players), the sample was restricted to 
those players with at least 2 but less than 4 years of service time at the end of the season: 
that is, one year either side of the official salary arbitration threshold. Figure 5 shows the 
average change in log salary over the next year by a player’s years of service time at the 
end of the season. The dramatic increase in salary growth at 2.8 years of service reflects 
the fact that most players qualify for the Super Two exception at this point. 
Column (1) of Table 5 repeats the specification from column (3) of Table 3 on the 
restricted sample of non-pitchers, using only the salary arbitration dummy variable to 
instrument  SAL ln ∆ . The salary growth rate is found to have a significant positive effect 
on OPS, with a coefficient that is almost twice that found in the full sample. The last year 
and bonus dummies are insignificant, which is not surprising, given that almost all these   20 
players are signed to one-year contracts with no bonuses. In contrast, no significant effect 
of salary growth on pitchers’ ERA is now found, as seen in column (3) of Table 5. 
In the case of a sharp (rather than fuzzy) regression-discontinuity design, everyone 
with a value above a threshold on some assignment variable receives treatment. This is 
arguably the case here, since only those who accrue more service time than the Super 
Two cut-off are eligible for salary arbitration.
14
it it it it it it BONUS LASTYR SERV SERV SARB y 5 4
2
3 2 1 β β β β β + + + + =
 In this case, it is appropriate to estimate 
the effect arbitration eligibility has on performance directly. Therefore, the following 
equation was estimated: 
 
  it t i ε γ µ + + + ,  (2) 
                                                 
14 Furthermore, almost all players receive much larger salaries once they pass  the salary arbitration 
threshold. 77% of non-pitchers and 65% of pitchers at least double their salary the year after they become 
eligible for salary arbitration, while only 5% of non-pitchers and 8% of pitchers experience falls in salary 
(and even they may have been anticipating an increase). 
Figure 5 
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Notes:  Players without salary data for the following season are excluded.   21 
where SARB is a dummy indicating whether a player is eligible for salary arbitration at 
the end of the current season. This specification compares those in their last year before 
salary arbitration eligibility, who are likely to earn much larger salaries in the following 
season, with those who still need to play at least one more season before attaining salary 
arbitration eligibility and consequently expect much lower salary growth in the following 
year. Hence, ceteris paribus, performance is predicted to be higher  among the latter 
group, meaning that  0 1 > β . 
When Equation (2) is estimated on the sample of non-pitchers, a significant positive 
coefficient on SARB is found, as seen in column (2) of Table 5. Those who become 
eligible for salary arbitration at the end of a season have OPS values that are 0.042 points 
lower than those in their last year before eligibility. This is around three times larger than 
the change implied by the IV estimates in Table 3. This approach is crucially dependent 
on having adequate controls for service time and, although unreported, the coefficients on 
SAL ln ∆  or SARB are robust to the inclusion of a cubic or quartic in service time (or, 
conversely, to the exclusion of service time altogether). Column (4) of Table 5 shows that 
SARB has an insignificant effect on ERA among pitchers, reflecting the findings from the 
Table 5 
Regression-Discontinuity Regressions for Players With 2-4 Years of Service time 
 
Variable  OPS among non-pitchers  ERA among pitchers 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Salary growth rate  0.022* 
(0.002)  –  -0.140 
(1.065)  – 
Salary arbitration eligible  –  0.042** 
(0.003)  –  -0.120 
(0.923) 


































Adjusted R-squared  0.609  0.588  0.294  0.305 
Number of observations  330  330  362  362 
Notes:  All regressions include a full set of player and year dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered by salary bargaining class and are presented in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
In columns (1) and (3), the salary growth rate is instrumented for by a dummy for salary 




This paper examines whether the large pay rises enjoyed by professional baseballers 
since the introduction of salary arbitration and free agency in the 1970s have resulted in 
performance improvements. According to certain efficiency wage models, workers who 
experience pay increases should increase their output to lower the possibility of layoff. 
Although baseball players are guaranteed employment for a specified number of seasons 
after they sign a contract, they may not receive another contract (or may receive a less 
lucrative contract) if they shirk. In this case, the higher a player’s expected future salary, 
the more effort he should expend in the current season. Evidence suggests that since the 
introduction of free agency both pitchers and non-pitchers have tended to exhibit rapidly 
improving performances during the early stages of their careers, during which they also 
typically experience the largest increases in salaries. Data on exact major league service 
time for players between 2005 and 2009 provide exogenous determinants of players’ 
salary growth rates. Both instrumental variables and regression-discontinuity estimation 
indicate that, controlling for experience, players perform better when they face rapidly 
rising salaries. Players also record better performances when they are in the last year of 
their contracts. The evidence suggests that while the free agency system has increased the 
costs of signing experienced players, this may have been partly offset by improved 
performances among younger players and those with expiring contracts. 
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Appendix
Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics for the 1950-2009 Sample 
 
Variable  Non-pitchers  Pitchers 
1950-1969  1981-2009  1950-1969  1981-2009 
On base plus slugging  0.709  0.732  –  – 
Earned run average  –  –  3.981  4.411 
Experience  2.704  3.980  2.461  3.079 
0-2 years of experience  0.588  0.462  0.632  0.577 
3-5 years of experience  0.242  0.241  0.218  0.210 
6 or more years of experience  0.170  0.297  0.151  0.213 
Number of observations  4,845  11,744  4,169  11,766 
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Table A2 
Descriptive Statistics for the 2005-2009 Sample 
 
Variable  Non-pitchers  Pitchers 
Full sample  2-4 year sample  Full sample  2-4 year sample 
On base plus slugging  0.753  0.759  –  – 
Earned run average  –  –  4.496  4.192 
Real salary ($)  3,304,285  725,598  2,265,696  604,099 
Salary growth rate  0.169  0.710  0.150  0.528 
Not salary arbitration eligible  0.312  0.424  0.444  0.456 
Salary arbitration eligible  0.198  0.576  0.190  0.544 
Last year before free agency  0.073  0  0.059  0 
Free agent  0.417  0  0.307  0 
Career service time (in years)  4.827  1.946  3.847  1.657 
Last year of contract  0.751  0.882  0.838  0.914 
Bonuses in contract  0.226  0.109  0.157  0.099 
Number of observations  1,636  330  1,769  362 
Note:  Salary is in 2009 dollars, adjusted using the Consumer Price Index price deflator. 